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Abstract 
The main objective of this article is to explore the convergence and 
divergence in both of these North American nations ' Cuba policy. The last 49 
years have been full of important and dramatic economic, political, militaiy, 
and socio-cultural events worldwide that have had an impact on this 
triangular relationship. Therefore, even the smallest attempt at covering all 
aspects over such a long period would be worthy of a much lengthier piece of 
writing. However, an overview of the post-19 59 period reveals a remarkable 
continuity in American Cuba policy. The main objective of successive United 
States governments, both Republican and Democrat, has been regime change 
by using a full arsenal of overt and covert means, while Canadian policy has 
diverged mostly in terms of the means to promote the desired changes that 
would bring Cuba back to the pattern of Western socio-economic capitalist 
formation. This article is mainly the result of a study of the initial years of the 
Cuban revolution, from 1959 to 1962, that were full of defining and 
transformational events. These events set the tone for the years to come 
against the backdrop of the prevailing order of international relations 
resulting from the Second World War and the Cold War. 
Résumé 
Le principal objectif de cet article consiste à examiner la convergence et la 
divergence de la politique de ces deux pays d'Amérique du Nord envers Cuba. 
Au cours des 49 dernières années, il y a eu une foule d'événements importants 
et spectaculaires sur les plans économique, politique, militaire et 
socio-culturel dans le monde qui ont eu une incidence sur cette relation 
triangulaire. Par conséquent, il vaudrait la peine de consacrer un texte 
beaucoup plus long même à la plus petite tentative d'examen de tous les 
aspects d'une période aussi longue. Cependant, un survol de la période 
postérieure à 1959 révèle une continuité remarquable dans la politique 
américaine à l'égard de Cuba. Le principal objectif des gouvernements 
américains qui se sont succédés, tant républicains que démocrates, a été de 
changer le régime en utilisant un arsenal complet de moyens secrets et 
déclarés tandis que la politique canadienne a divergé surtout du point de vue 
des moyens utilisés pour promouvoir les changements souhaités qui 
ramèneraient Cuba au sein des pays capitalistes occidentaux. Cet article 
résulte surtout d'une étude des premières années de la révolution cubaine, de 
1959 à 1962, au cours desquelles il s'est produit un grand nombre 
d'événements qui ont façonné et transformé la société cubaine. Ces 
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événements ont donné le ton pour les années à venir dans le contexte de 
l'ordre des relations internationales qui a prévalu par suite de la Deuxième 
guerre mondiale et de la guerre froide. 
The year 1959 became a turning point in the history of the Cuban republic; 
the triumph of the Cuban Revolution marked the beginning of a process of 
profound socio-economic and political transformations on the island nation 
that were translated into a clean break with the socio-economic and political 
pattern prevailing in the rest of the western hemisphere, which had long 
been the hegemonic domain of the United States. Cuba's national social 
revolution was based on a strong and swift structural transformation that 
began incorporating new property and class relations and that limited the 
private capitalist accumulation. 
Consequently, the initial reaction of the United States government, with 
the support of the Cuban propertied class, was to resort to economic, 
political, and diplomatic pressure, and internal subversion. Both the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations overtly tried very hard, turning 
to NATO and the Organization of American States, to form a multilateral 
coalition to enforce economic sanctions and to promote the political and 
diplomatic isolation of a new Cuban government. Both US administrations 
used covert political pressure on allies such as Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and Canada1 to force support for such punitive actions. 
Therefore, the extraterritorial dimension of US policy toward Cuba since 
the early months of the revolution lead the new Cuban government to 
become involved in more than one triangular conflict with several 
international actors in different geographical areas. Thé main objective was 
to try to minimize the impact of these initial economic sanctions by looking 
to purchase machinery, spare parts, and other supplies that could not be 
acquired in the suddenly off-limits US market. 
At that jpoint in time, Cuba's relations with the two North American 
nations were totally asymmetrical; the island's relations with the United 
States and by extension its corporations had a strong historical and 
socio-cultural component, and the economic relations were that of heavy 
dependence, especially since 1902. Canada had a small but solid presence, 
especially in the banking and insurance sector, and had only recently 
established political and diplomatic ties. 
The nationalist positions advocated and promoted by the Cuban 
government soon after 1 January 1959; the island's economic, political, and 
socio-cultural relations with the United States; and the nature2 and 
dynamics of Canadian-American relations in the context of the Cold War as 
the prevailing post-Second World War order of international relations all 
became a great challenge to bilateral relations between Canada and Cuba, 
the main component of which was trade and financial relations.3 
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In this context, the triangular relationship appeared to reach a conflict 
stage as Cuban policy-makers sought to counteract the effects of the United 
States' reaction to the radicalization of the revolution that was to initially 
impose an economic embargo. The Cuban government that emerged from 
the 1959 revolution tried to preserve and expand its links with Canada, since 
Canada's export-oriented economy was in a unique position to at least 
partially fill the void that the sudden suspension of trade with the Unites 
States created in terms of commercial exchange. 
In terms of international relations, the Unites States and Canada were to 
reach the condition of complex interdependence regardless of the high 
asymmetry4 that characterized it. Another important factor to be taken into 
account is that the much-lauded largest bilateral relation must be framed in 
Cold War terms as the prevailing bipolar order of the international relations 
resulting from the Second World War. 
Given Canada's great historical, cultural, social, political, defence, and 
security relations with the United States, it is worthy to note that although 
there was ideological convergence on the Cuba issue, it also brought to the 
forefront a historical divergence between the two North American 
neighbours. The three-way relation has evolved ever since and has reached 
the present in a triangle of tension and co-operation5 that has characterized 
the 49 years that have followed 1 January 1959. 
Canada-U.S. Relations in Context 
One side of the triangle, which is in no shape or form an equilateral one if 
one looks at the Cuba-US and the Cuba-Canada relationships, is the 
Canada-US side. Undoubtedly, Canada-US comparisons have long been 
subject to vigorous debate, not only in academia and in the realm of 
policy-making and practitioners, but also among everyday common 
individuals on both sides of the 49th parallel. 
From an international relations perspective, it is safe to conclude that the 
relations between Canada and the United States since the end of the Second 
World War have evolved into a condition of complex interdependence in 
which non-state and transnational actors play an increasingly important 
role in shaping the economic, social, political, and military bilateral 
relation. 
The extent of similarities and differences in values and belief systems, 
and their evolution over time, are extremely important, for they have found 
their expression in the foreign policy of both nation-states. Post-1959 Cuba 
policy is an example of how the two nations, while essentially converging 
within the Western pattern of civilization, also have important points of 
divergence. 
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There are several arguments to support the case for important divergence 
between Canada and the United States. One argument contends that the 
variations in the prevailing value systems of the two countries may have 
more to do with their basic structural differences, which are basically 
derived from the foundation of both countries and the geographical space 
they occupy. However, as they have become more interdependent in the 
context of globalization, the formation of regional blocs and deeper North 
American integration — the structural differences — tend to disappear. 
There is also a historical argument to provide that both countries are 
essentially different. Seymour Martin Lipset makes the stronger case for 
this: "Canada has been a more class aware, law-abiding, collectivity 
oriented, and pluralistic (group oriented) society than the United States and 
these fundamental distinctions stem largely from the events that divided 
British North America, the American Revolution."6 
These basic differences have remained over time, as pollster Michael 
Adams7 claimed in his recent book. Canada and the United States are 
"fundamentally different" and "always have been," he argues: the two 
countries "were separated at birth, organized and governed differently." 
Adams suggests that the principles of both constitutions and nation-
building diverge from the original intent. 
Robert Bothwell also argues in favour of this historical argument to 
stress the divergence, between the two North American countries, and 
incorporates the socio-demographic and geographical aspects when 
comparing the early characteristics of both countries. He reminds us that in 
British North America, "the people were newer with shallower roots ... 
there was less land on which to settle, though there was plenty of rock and 
muskeg to accommodate wildlife."8 In Bothwell's correct appreciation, 
this contributed to the formation of a more compressed and constrained 
society in which a Tory conservative, collectivist pattern of life was rooted, 
making Canada essentially different from the United States. 
As the United States made the economic blockade the cornerstone of its 
Cuba policy, and has subsequently tried to politically and diplomatically 
isolate Cuba so as to bring about internal change in the smaller nation, it also 
found divergent approaches as to how achieve the same objective in other 
Western nations — Canada, the United States' geographically closest ally, 
among them. 
It must be made clear that both the American and the Canadian 
governments as representatives of their respective ruling classes shared 
similar ideological positions on the side of the Western alliance; therefore, 
differences in their approaches to dealing with the new government in 
Havana must be seen in terms of process rather than substance. In the words 
of one of Canada's most accomplished international relations scholars: "It 
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is important to bear in mind, however, that countries can be united in a 
common purpose, but differ over tactics[;] it is in fact difference over tactics 
rather than ultimate ends [that] will continue to cause dispute between our 
two countries... the way in which the United States-Canadian relations can 
be bruised by differences on an international issue has been more pleasantly 
revealed over the question of Cuba."9 
The United States Trade Embargo and Canada-Cuba Relations, 
1959-1962 
The rapid succession of events, actions, and responses in the escalating 
spiral that characterized the bilateral relations between Cuba and the United 
States soon after the initial months in 1959 had an impact on both 
Canada-US and Canada-Cuba relations. 
The issue of trade had an important political implication. Trade relations 
specifically involved all three actors in a three-part connection that had very 
intense manifestations during the first couple of years that followed 1 
January 1959. The evolution of events that unfolded soon after the first 
steps of the Moncada Program • ° illustrate well the extent to which Canadian 
foreign policy-making process can be affected by the initiatives of 
American foreign policy, even when the primary target of the policy is not 
Canada itself. 
Unites States government officials privately admitted that Cuba acted as 
an irritant between the two North American countries.11 That the United 
States government envisioned Canada's position regarding the new 
government of Cuba as taking advantage "to make a quick buck," thus 
permitting Cuba to circumvent the embargo, was more a political concern 
than an economic problem. From Washington's standpoint, Canadian 
opposition to supporting the economic stranglehold of Cuba helped 
undermine their efforts to topple a government whose nationalist stance 
was affecting American economic interests; furthermore, it challenged 
American hegemony in the western hemisphere. In the view of the United 
States government, the left-leaning positions of the Cuban government 
could open the door to Communist penetration into what was considered by 
many the United States' backyard: Latin America and the Caribbean. 
For Canada's conservative government, the option for independent Cuba 
policy was based on a sovereign position that was consistent with its 
tradition in favour of multilateral action, an international projection of a 
middle power with no imperialist or hegemonic designs over Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Canada's stance was also based in part on the genuine 
belief that embargo and isolation would push Cuba to the eastern side of the 
Cold War divide. Therein lies another significant point of divergence in 
both North American nations' approach to dealing with the new Cuban 
government after 1959. 
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As the island's new leadership tried to construct a new model of 
economic and social development with nationalist and anti-imperialist 
characteristics, the trade and political relations with Canada constituted a 
much-needed short-term open door to the West, and the possibility of trying 
to construct a different kind of relationship than that of subordinated and 
dependent capitalism. 
As the new Cuban government sought to reorient its foreign trade by 
increasing its trade relations with Canada, it met the opposition of the 
United States government. The triangle reached the conflict stage during 
the second year of the Cuban Revolution, in 1960. 
The purpose of the following section is to take a closer look at the efforts 
of the United States government to secure the co-operation of the Canadian 
government, and by extension Canadian private enterprise, and at the 
Canadian responses regarding adhering to the provisions of the unilateral 
action of the United States to impose a trade embargo that would drastically 
restrict the trade flow to and from Cuba, thereby causing the collapse of the 
new Cuban government. 
An Overview of U.S.-Cuba Relations vis-à-vis Canada-Cuba 
Relations: A Necessary Point of Departure 
In 1846, the free trade winds blowing in Great Britain led to the unilateral 
decision of eliminating wheat and other products from her North American 
provinces to access the British market,12 a heavy blow to the British-
Canadian merchants who had long benefited from the great advantages of 
having Canadian staple industry consigned for England.13 A few years 
later, in 1865, the United States administration of Andrew Johnson 
announced the abrogation of the Elgin-Marcy14 treaty of commercial 
reciprocity between the British North American provinces and the United 
States. In response, the Canadian founding fathers sought to find more 
markets in anticipatipn of Confederation by sending a trade mission to the 
Caribbean, which visited Cuba on 17 March 1866, still under Spanish 
colonial rule but increasingly developing commercial and socio-cultural 
ties with the United States. 
There is plenty of evidence of efforts that were encouraged by 
representatives of the ruling elites of Canada to promote trade and even to 
compete with the United States for markets in the Spanish West Indies. The 
intention was made clear to the Spanish authorities in a letter signed after 
the meetings in Havana and delivered in person by a trade commissioner to 
the intendente in Cadiz: 
But is it prudent, is it wise, for Spain to allow her rich West Indian 
possessions to remain wholly dependent for many necessaries on a 
single source of supply, and the source is the United States ... will it 
120 
Convergence and Divergence in United States and Canadian Cuba Policy 
Post-1959: A Triangular Comparative Analysis 
not be a sound policy to encourage and foster a competing source of 
supply in British North America, the provinces of which when united 
in one government as it is now contemplated, will form from the outset 
a confederation of about 4 million people, well qualified to establish 
in the continent of North America a check and counterpoise to the 
aggressive and absorbing principle which seems to animate the 
democracy of the United States.1 
The statement reflects an important divergence in terms of foreign policy 
projection by establishing a clear difference between British North America 
and its southern neighbour, whose foreign projection was by then defined by 
the Monroe Doctrine. 
There were other subsequent attempts to establish commercial linkages and 
open up markets since the early years of the Dominion to which the same 
triangular rationale may be applied. As early as 1876, Prime Minister 
Alexander Mackenzie wrote to Sir Alexander T. Gait, former finance minister 
and ambassador at large: "I have been informed that you intend to visit part of 
the West Indies soon; I have long thought that we could extend our commerce to 
that region ... Trade with Cuba and Saint Domingue is due to its magnitude 
more important than the rest of the islands."16 Again, the desire of finding new 
markets for the export-oriented economy of the Dominion is clearly expressed 
at a point when the United States was asserting economic control over Cuba and 
the rest of the Caribbean islands. 
With the transfer of colonial hegemony of Cuba from Spain to the United 
States as a result of a quick inter-imperialist conflict, the new United States 
occupation government (1899-1902) promulgated a series of decrees that 
allowed for the chartering of foreign banks. 
Canadian banks and insurance companies17 were quick to establish solid 
operations in Cuba that were to guarantee them an important presence in 
Cuba's economy previous to 1959; the Royal Bank was the most successful. 
By 1923, the Royal Bank had come into possession of at least 16 sugar mills 
and 300 acres of fertile sugar cane growing land. The World Bank report 
listed the Royal Bank number one among all commercial banks in total 
deposits.18 
A brief historical overview of the bilateral relations of both North 
American countries with Cuba would result in identifying a number of 
fundamental differences in term of the nature, extent, and closeness each 
actor—Canada and the United States—had with Cuba in the years prior to 
1959. For Canada, Cuba policy was undoubtedly less central to its overall 
foreign policy agenda than the island had been all along for the United 
States. The Canada-Cuba relationship had been primarily based on trade 
since the mid-18th century. Nevertheless, it is an obvious fact that Canada 
had never approximated the degree of involvement the Unites States 
achieved in its relations with Cuba19 due, in most part, to the almost 
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impregnable fortress that was the neo-colonial relationship the former 
erected around the island, especially after the early years of the 20th 
century. 
Canada's potential trade with Cuba was certainly affected by that 
neo-colonial relationship that the United States had imposed upon Cuba 
since 1902 with the consent of the Cuban ruling elites. The Piatt amendment 
and, most significantly in terms of trade, the signing of the US-Cuba 
Reciprocity Treaty of 1902 were the main instruments of Cuba's 
neo-colonial status.20 
An early instance of conflict between Canada and the United States over 
Cuba trade occurred in 1917, when Canada promised to take nearly double 
their sugar quota provided that the Cuban authorities could get American 
approval. The US response by then food administrator Herbert Hoover was 
to send a letter to the British food controller in London that forced Canada to 
withdraw its bid for the Cuban market. Subsequently, both Liberal and 
Conservative governments remained somewhat distant from any 
involvement in Cuba's political affairs, which were overwhelmingly 
centred on US-Cuba relations. 
The year 1959 ushered in a new scenario in Canada-Cuba relations, 
notwithstanding the fact that the first year of the Cuban Revolution showed 
noticeably little change because Cuba's socio-economic structure 
remained basically intact despite some initial confrontation over the issue 
of agrarian reform and the political transformations that were taking place. 
During 1959 Cuba's foreign trade remained mainly centred on US imports 
and exports. 
The next year elicited unprecedented interest in Canada over the 
question of the treatment accorded to Canadian businesses in Cuba, as the 
US government began to gradually impose the economic embargo and 
severed its political and diplomatic ties with Havana; Canadian companies 
then appeared as an option to fill the void left by US companies that had 
dominated the Cuban economy. At the same time, the top leadership of the 
new revolutionary government was trying to preserve and expand its 
economic links with Canada, as it became an obvious fact that Canada was 
then in a unique position to provide for the much-needed manufactured 
commodities and spare parts that Cuba could not acquire from its regular, 
US suppliers. In many ways, Canadian companies had the same technology 
and standards as US subsidiaries, as the then Cuban ambassador in Ottawa, 
Américo Cruz, notes in a report to Cuba's Minister of Foreign Affairs Raul 
Roa: "In terms of economic relations they [Canada] have a situation similar 
to what we had previous to 1959."21 Obviously, Ambassador Cruz was 
referring to the degree of economic interdependence between Canada and 
the United States compared to the level of dependence the Cuban economy 
had on the United States. 
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In the context of the export-oriented Canadian economy, Canadian 
companies, especially those in the job-generating manufacturing sector, 
could gain access to the Cuban market, which had been dominated by the 
United States corporations since the second half of the 19th century. 
However, US efforts to prevent Canada from taking advantage of that 
opportunity, mostly by way of political and diplomatic pressure, and 
Canada's reticence to go along provoked tension in the bilateral relation. 
One important fact in understanding the volume of trade and the 
possibilities of opening up Canadian business in Cuba is that despite the 
growing tensions between Washington and Havana during 1959, American 
companies exported US$436 million in products and spare parts to Cuba, 
$26.2 million in automobile parts, $27.3 million in electrical, and over $ 18 
million in industrial machinery. 
Table 1. U.S.-Cuba, Canada-Cuba commercial exchange compared 
Years 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1'958 
1959 
US Business with Cuba 
United States 
sold in millions 
($) 
458.47 
519.13 
617.98 
546.20 
436.70 
United States 
bought in millions 
(S) 
421.65 
457.09 
481.86 
523.98 ' 
474.36 
Canadian Business with Cuba 
Canada sold in 
millions ($) 
13.91 
15,37 
16,89 
17,59 
15,25 
Canada bought 
in millions ($) 
10.02 
12,28 
13,87 
18,88 
12,04 
Cuba looked to United States for some 80% of its imports of food, machineiy, 
chemicals, raw materials, and thousands of other items required by a nation that 
was a net importer of foodstuffs. In return, Cuba sold during a half-centwy 
period at least 70% of its exports of sugar, tobacco, and other products to the 
1 United States. | 
Source: The Financial Post, 29 October 1960. 
US and Canadian Reactions to Early Cuban Government Action 
At the same time, the efforts of the Cuban government to transform its 
neo-colonial condition that made it dependent on the United States 
naturally met the opposition of the latter, which was the main beneficiary of 
such status. The main sectors of the Cuban economy were basically under 
the control of American corporations. From the perspective of the 
American ruling elite, cutting off trade would render Cuba unable to 
function. 
As early as 21 January 1959, the idea of imposing economic sanctions on 
Cuba was part of the rhetoric of US government officials.22 The first action 
that prompted an American reaction to the new Cuban government was the 
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Agrarian Reform of 17 May 1959, which was basically in accordance with 
the Cuban constitution of 1940, a long overdue action that was aimed at 
transforming the pattern of land tenure on the island.23 The reaction of the 
United States government was, on 12 June 1959, to demand prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation. This demand was not in accordance 
with international law: the accepted practice since 1938 was that of 
compensation as agreed upon by the parties involved.24 Therefore, from the 
Cuban perspective, the nationalizations were a sovereign act in the national 
interest. Moreover, the Cuban state was literally unable to afford the 
compensation payments due to lack of co-operation on the part of the 
United States government.25 
Cuba's national action and lack of compliance in returning US-owned 
property26 led to the first of several proclamations directed against trade 
with the revolutionary government. On 19 October 1960, President 
Eisenhower authorized the secretary of commerce to place Cuba on the US 
Export Control List, thereby cutting off all exports to the island except 
non-subsidized foodstuff, medicines, and medical supplies. In President 
Eisenhower's words, "[if] the Cuban people got hungry enough they would 
throw Castro out."27 
The United States government did inform its Canadian counterpart of the 
action it was about to take and of how Canadian subsidiaries would be 
affected. However, there are a few aspects that must be reviewed in order to 
have a clear understanding of the events that were to unfold as well as 
Canada's relation to it. 
The United States Export Control Act of 1949 established an Office of 
Export Control in the Department of Commerce, which had the authority to 
prohibit the exportation from the United States of "all commodities and 
technical data" unless a general license granting such permission was 
issued by the Office. All foreign countries, as potential importers, were 
classified into groups, each group being subject to differing degrees of 
control, with the Communist states subject to the severest controls. Within 
this category, a tripartite subdivision existed: Soviet-bloc states in one 
category, Cuba in another, and China, North Korea, and North Vietnam 
comprising the third, in increasing order of regulatory control. 
It is crucial to point out that Canada was alone in that it was exempted 
from the above process of classification. The United States permitted the 
unregulated export of nearly all commodities and technology of American 
origin if Canada remained the final destination of consumption or use. First, 
the re-exportation of all goods originating outside Canada (i.e., 
overwhelmingly American goods) required an export permit. Second, the 
Canadian government regulated its own export trade under the authority of 
the Export and Import Permits Act and the Area Control List, which was 
modelled after the secret COCOM (Coordinating Committee for 
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Multilateral Export Control) List of NATO, which banned the traffic of a 
wide variety of goods classified as "strategic." 
In view of these interrelationships, it is difficult to see how the imposition 
of American economic controls could not directly affect Canada-Cuba 
trade and, for that matter, Canadian sovereignty. It is against this backdrop 
that the United States' unilateral embargo was placed. 
The repercussions of the US unilateral actions toward Cuba were to be 
felt in all the countries to the West in general, and within the NATO alliance 
states as well as in Latin American countries, thus generating other 
triangular relations as the United States government sought to isolate Cuba. 
However, the case of Canada deserves to be singled out due to the nature of 
the relation — that is, the growing economic, political, and military 
interconnectedness of Canada and the United States in the post-Second 
World War world. This development, since 1960, served to spotlight public 
attention on the issue of the US extraterritorial laws, which often regulated 
the export policies of Canadian subsidiaries. Moreover, it called into 
question the scope of American economic, political, and, for that matter, 
military penetration of Canada. However, of all the foreign assets and 
non-Cuban capital stock appropriated by eminent domain or expropriated 
without immediate compensation by the new Cuban government, none was 
treated more selectively, and for that matter more diplomatically, than 
Canadian enterprises and nationals. 
Cuban-Canadian companies were excluded from the initial 
nationalization decrees of the Cuban government. Canadian companies 
were treated according to the rules of international law, and although 
Canada-Cuba bilateral relations were also affected by disputes, the way 
they were settled shows a distinct pattern, notwithstanding the fact that 
Canadian interests in Cuba were somewhat limited to specific areas. 
On 1 July 1960, in its first major act of expropriation, the Cuban 
government peacefully seized all of the plant equipment and property of the 
Standard Oil of New Jersey, Texaco, and Shell Petroleum companies in 
Cuba. The seizures were in direct response to the refusal of the three 
subsidiaries to refine shipments of lower-priced Soviet crude oil, which 
began arriving on the island parting compliance with the USSR-Cuba Oil 
Agreement, signed on 1 April 1960 during the visit of Anastas Mikoyan, 
Soviet foreign minister to Havana. 
This initial expropriation proved to be of direct concern to certain 
Canadian interests, for it was disclosed immediately after that Shell de 
Cuba's marketing operations were overseen by the Shell Oil Co. of Canada, 
the largest oil manufacturer in the country, which was incorporated in 
Canada as a "holding company" under the rubric of Canadian Shell Ltd., 
limiting its de jure Canadian status.28 
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A new wave of nationalization edicts were promulgated several months 
later, on 13 and 14 October. The decrees placed 382 Cuban and foreign-
owned businesses, with an estimated value of US$2 billion in total assets, 
under both state ownership and state control for the first time. The entire 
trade sector of the economy was nationalized, as well as all banking 
establishments on the island except two: the 24 branches of the Royal Bank 
and the eight branches of the Bank of Nova Scotia. 
The reasons of the new government of Cuba for exempting the Canadian 
banks from the October decrees have been the subject of a good deal of 
speculation. One widely accepted hypothesis suggests that the government 
sought to keep at least one banking channel to the free currency exchange 
market. Canadian banks, as in the case of the potential purchase of spare 
parts and manufactured goods, were in the best position because of their 
long-standing involvement in Cuban banking affairs and their connections 
with the United States, geographically as well as financially. 
For Ottawa, that pattern of exceptional treatment accorded to Canadian 
companies and nationals was one reason for maintaining a completely 
different approach toward its relations with Cuba than that of the United 
States: "The United States' authorities expressed that the economic 
measures taken by the Cuban government against the interests of the United 
States and its citizens are arbitrary, illegal and discriminatory, so that it 
requires of an embargo against Cuba/Canada does not justify an embargo or 
* similar measures because the treatment of the interests of Canada and that 
of its citizens has been different."29 
The Cuba Trade Debate and Increased Triangular Tension 
Once economic ties between Cuba and the United States were finally 
severed on 19 October 1960 when the US trade embargo was put in place by 
the Eisenhower administration, one of the first actions of the revolutionary 
government in Cuba was to turn to Canada. The debate over Cuban trade, 
both domestically in Canada and in terms of Canada-US relations, reached 
its highest point with the visit, on 8 December 1960, of a Cuban commercial 
delegation seeking to increase imports from Canada, headed by then 
Minister of the Economy Regino Boti.30 The Canadian government's 
reaction after their initial surprise was summed up in a statement by 
Canada's minister for international trade, George Hees: "Canada would be 
willing to sell the products that Cuba is unable to acquire as a result of the 
US embargo."31 
That statement was welcomed in both Ottawa and Havana.because there 
were clear advantages for both, but it was a great source of dismay for 
Washington. The advantage for Canada was that the United States was 
"rapidly disengaging from the Cuban market."32 Canada could obtain large 
economic gains at Washington's expense just by filling the ensuing trade 
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void, particularly in the sale of manufactured goods and spare parts. To 
Cuba, Canada appeared the short-term natural substitute for trade due to its 
geographical proximity, as opposed to Europe, to its close relations with the 
United States, and to the fact that Canadian companies who were in many 
cases branch plants of US companies and had basically the same 
technology. 
Canadian nationalism and its relations with the United States received 
extraordinary attention in the media, which raised more fundamental 
questions regarding Canadian independence. Given the role of the media in 
shaping public debate, a small sample of headlines appearing on influential 
Canadian dailies show some of the viewpoints held by the public, which had 
an impact on the Canadian foreign policy-making process. In 1960, the 
Financial Post wrote, "Castro says Canadians Very Welcome."33 In 
October, as the debate over trade raged on, the same paper wrote, "Can We 
Do Business with Castro's Cuba?"34 
The 1960 Canadian Annual Review asserts that a high official of the 
United States Department of Commerce had endeavoured to enlist 
Canada's support for the enforcement of the October embargo on 11 
December 1960, but that the attempt had been "without success." This is 
substantiated by a headline that appeared on the following day in the Globe 
and Mail, which stated that Secretary of State Herter "failed to get Canada 
to co-operate in the United States' economic squeeze against Cuba ... 
which includes, from the United States' point of view, a ban on strategic 
exports to the recalcitrant island dictatorship."35 
The article goes on to say that Bradley Fisk, assistant secretary of 
' commerce for international affairs (the US "high official" mentioned 
above), said that efforts to obtain such support "would continue." When 
asked whether specific pressures might be brought to bear on the Canadian 
government or Canadian industry, Fisk was quoted as saying, "No action is 
contemplated—we will respect Canada's sovereignty in every way, but we 
will keep reminding Canada of our mutual fight against Communism."36 
Canada's Response to the US Commercial Embargo against 
Cuba 
The government of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker expressed its 
opposition to the United States commercial blockade against Cuba in a 
speech to the House of Commons on 12 December 12 1960: "We respect the 
other nation's opinions as to their relations with Cuba as much as we expect 
that our points of view be respected. Canada reserves the right to trade with 
any country, including Cuba, and any commodity it so pleases."37 This 
statement represents a clear allusion to the United States' pressures on 
Canada to break its traditional commercial ties with Cuba and join the 
embargo against the island. At the same time, it highlights once again the 
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Canadian government's divergent position regarding its relationship with 
Cuba. 
Washington's continuing pressure on Canada and the evolution of the 
situation in Cuba in the context of the Cold War drove the Canadian 
government to define Canada-Cuba trade policy. On 23 December 1960, 
Diefenbaker issued the following statement: 
1 ) No shipment of arms, ammunition, military and related equipment, 
or materials of clearly strategic nature will be or has been licensed 
for export from Canada to Cuba for more than a year. This course 
is based on the Government's general policy of refraining from 
exporting such goods or commodities, to areas of tension 
anywhere in the world. 
2) A tight control is exercised on the export of goods such as aircraft 
engines, which may in certain circumstances have strategic 
significance. Individual exports permits are required in each case 
and, as applications are received, the circumstances determine 
whether the export of the goods concerned has a strategic 
significance, and if not a permit is issued. 
3) As to Canadian goods of a non-strategic nature, there are no 
limitations on such trade with Cuba.38 
The issued statement highlighted once again the desire of the Canadian 
government to maintain the bilateral commercial relationship with the 
Cuban revolutionary government, and defined its position toward the 
United States' commercial embargo against Cuba. Moreover, this 
document represents a brief summary of the main aspects of Canadian 
foreign policy in general. 
Canada's decision to not export arms, ammunition, military, or related 
equipment — that is, strategic goods — to Cuba was consistent, for it is 
Canada's general .policy to not sell strategic goods to areas of tension in the 
world. However, as outlined in the points above, the Canadian government 
did not impose any limitations as to the trade of non-strategic goods with the 
island. Ottawa felt capable of following its own chosen path, but it was also 
present in the minds of Canadian policy-makers that the United States was 
Canada's political ally as well as its biggest commercial partner. Canada 
looked for a multilateral approach and sought support from other countries, 
members of NATO and allies of the United States, to follow a divergent path 
to that of a trade embargo on Cuba. Cuba became a point of disagreement 
between both countries. 
Ottawa's policy-makers strongly expressed their concern that the US 
embargo would have the effect of driving Cuba into the Soviet camp. Thus, 
there was a belief that it was up to countries like Canada and the United 
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Kingdom39 to do what they could in order to maintain the links with Havana. 
The concern about the US policy toward Cuba is well reflected here: "We do 
not minimize American concern, but it is the Government's view that to 
maintain mutually beneficial economic relations with Cuba may help and 
contribute to the restoration of traditional relationships between Cuba and 
the Western world."40 
While there is plenty of evidence that by 1961 the Canadian government 
was convinced that Cuba was a Communist country and that it found some 
of Cuba's actions deplorable, that did not constitute a reason for departing 
from normal relations. This position was also consistent; Canada had 
developed a commercial relationship with the People's Republic of China, 
which was then considered a strong part of the Communist Sino-Soviet 
alliance. 
One last element to support Canada's divergent position was that the 
balance of trade with Cuba showed that Canada maintained a trade surplus 
from 1959 to 1964. 
Table 2. Canada Cuba Trade Balance 
Year 
1957 
1958 
1959 
I960 
1 1961 
1 1962 
1963 
| 1964 
Canadian Imports from 
Cuba (CANS) 
13,840 
18,836 
12,011 
7,243 
5,034 
2,803 
13,041 
.3,464 
Canadian Exports to 
Cuba (CANS) 
16,846 
17,549 
15,222 
13,038 
31,104 
10,878 
16,433 
60,930 
Trade Balance (CANS) 
3,006 
(1,287)1 
3,211 
5,795 1 
26,070 
8,075 
3,3921 
57,466j 
Source: Statistics Canada, Canada 1958-1965 Yearbook 
Naturally, Canada was taking advantage of the situation and siphoning 
the already scarce foreign exchange of Cuba. That fact was acknowledged 
in a statement on CBC-TV shortly after the Canada's participation as an 
observer at the Organization of American States conference in Punta del 
Este, Uruguay: "It should be recalled also that trade with Cuba in 
non-strategic goods runs heavily in favor of Canada so there can be no 
possibility of earnings by Cuba on her exports to Canada being used, as has 
been suggested by the press to promote communist subversion in 
neighboring countries. On the contrary, Cuban trade with Canada is 
absorbing dollars secured from other sources."41 The Canadian prime 
minister cautioned, "Embargoes and trade controls are powerful and 
sometimes double-edged weapons. If we use them towards Cuba we may be 
129 
International Journal of Canadian Studies 
Revue internationale d'études canadiennes 
under pressure to use them elsewhere and unnecessary damage will be done 
to Canadian trade."42 Dièfenbaker also maintained that isolating the island 
from Western trade and diplomatic contact would instead drive it to farther 
reliance on less desirable associations.43 
The Canadian government continuously rejected the pressures from both 
the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to support American 
attempts to isolate Cuba. The years 1961-1962 would prove to be a more 
complex period for the triangular relationship as issues other than trade 
came into play in the context of the Cold War. An increased US effort to 
bring about a change of regime in Cuba combined economic isolation with 
diplomatic, military, and subversive components. 
Cuba's Reaction to United States Policy and its Impact on the 
Canada-Cuba Relationship 
On 16 January 1961, then Cuban ambassador in Ottawa Américo Cruz 
wrote in a report to his minister, after having met with Mr. Howard Green, 
then Canadian Minister of Foreign Relations, "The minister told me that 
they had to maintain cordial relations with the United States, but it 
continues to be a principle of their foreign policy and trade policy to 
maintain Canadian independence. However, he told me that we must not 
forget the situation in which they are in relation to the United States."44 
The Cuban revolutionary government gave a fair assessment of the 
Canadian government's position, as well as of the potential impact of US 
responses in terms of political rhetoric and action since the early months of 
the Revolution. Such a position is reflected in the following excerpt from a 
letter from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to its ambassador in 
Ottawa: "We call your attention upon the fact that the resistance provided by 
the government of Canada, up to now, to the United States' continuing 
pressures, aimed at forcing Canada to join the blockade of Cuba, must not 
be underestimated."45 In this message and in subsequent communication 
with the Cuban ambassador, the Cuban foreign ministry urged the Cuban 
ambassador to use all the tools of the diplomatic arsenal to safeguard the 
interests of maintaining a positive relationship with Canada despite the 
fundamental ideological differences that separated both governments: 
"The best thing to do is to work harder in terms of confidence building 
actions that would strengthen the relation between Canada and Cuba."46 
The Political and Diplomatic Dimension in the Triangular 
Relationship 
On the diplomatic and political front, Canada formally announced 
recognition of the new Cuban government on 8 January 1959, the day the 
rebel army entered Havana and one day after the United States accorded 
similar treatment. It was Canada's minister of foreign relations, Sydney 
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Smith, who gave instructions to its ambassador in Cuba to "confirm the 
desire of the Canadian government to maintain friendly relations with the 
Cuban Revolutionary government."47 The position of granting official 
recognition to the Cuban revolutionary government is in accordance with a 
traditional tenet of Canadian foreign policy, as Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker writes in his memoirs: "Our interaction is guided by the 
international rules that exist between two sovereign nations. It was 
Canada's duty to maintain with Cuba the cordial relations customary with 
the recognized government of another country."48 Canada's conservative 
government was to maintain its diplomatic recognition of the new Cuban 
government. However, the relationship was not to be free of contradictions, 
for there were political, ideological, and security issues involved. 
At the political level, there were obvious differences between the 
Canadian and the American approach to Cuba. On 12-14 July 1960, in 
Montebello, Quebec, at a conference to discuss defence issues, Cuba was 
discussed, having been brought up by the United States' delegation as 
requested by President Eisenhower himself in a note to his Canadian 
counterpart. After describing the actions of the Cuban government as 
unreasonable and provocative and inviting Soviet penetration into the 
western hemispheres, he went on to say, "I thought it might be useful for 
Secretary Herter to discuss the question with Mr. Howard Green when they 
meet in Ottawa this coming week[.] I would be most grateful if the views of 
your government about this tragic situation would be made known by Mr. 
Green to Mr. Herter in that meeting."49 Mr. Green did convey the Canadian 
position, as H. Basil Robinson comments in his book Diefenbaker s World: 
A Populist in Foreign Affairs: "The Canadians spoke with such frankness 
and resolve that the Americans were stunned at the differences of their 
analysis from that of the Canadians."50 
There was indeed profound divergence between the United States and 
the Canadian approach to the political relationship with Cuba, and it was 
marked by the distinct Canadian view that the causes of the Cuban 
revolution were indigenous rather than the result of a Communist 
expansion in the western hemisphere. Diefenbaker would later confirm this 
in his statement of 23 December 1960. From that moment on, Cuba would 
be a point of friction between the two neighbours and allies, along with the 
issue of nuclear weapons, for it became obvious that Washington had 
mistakenly taken for granted Ottawa's support in its policy of isolating 
Cuba. In fact, during the earliest years of the Cuban Revolution, the use of 
diplomatic pressures constituted the principal modus operandi of both 
Eisenhower and later the Kennedy administrations. 
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The Defence and Security Dimension of the Triangular 
Relationship 
The aspects of defence and security are very important in foreign policy. 
They become even more relevant in this case when one looks at the 
Canadian and American defence relationship against the backdrop of the 
Cold War. Since the Cuban government had been classified as a 
Communist country the positions of both Canada and the United States 
would converge to a great extent. 
As early as 1938, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King had expressed mutual commitments toward co-operative defence; 
two years later the Ogdensburg Treaty (1940) was signed, the Joint Board 
on Defence was created, and a year later the Hyde Park agreement extended 
the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act for British purchases of weapons. 
During the Second World War years, there existed full a partnership, which 
began after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941, 
although Canada's commonwealth connection made Canadian forces stay 
away from the Pacific theatre of operations, where the United Stated 
concentrated its war effort before June 1944. 
The end of the war brought about*a new world order in which Canada and 
the United States were founding members of NATO. Both North American 
nations would co-operate during the Korean War and later increase their 
defence integration with the. creation of the North American Air Defense 
Command. There has been increased naval co-operation and intelligence 
sharing ever since. 
In terms of Cuba policy before 1959, there was no divergence between 
Canada and the United States on the issue of the export of military 
equipment to Cuba, since right up to March 1958, the United States would 
supply all arms requirements to Cuba. However, in March 1958, the 
Eisenhower administration suspended all supplies of arms to Cuba as rebel 
actions increased. The Cuban government of Fulgencio Batista turned to 
Canada to purchase airplanes and ammunitions. The Canadian government 
turned down all requests. 
After the triumph of the revolution of 1959, Canada was caught in the 
dilemma of fulfilling its obligation as a NATO and NORAD member in the 
context of the Cold War. The issue of the sales of weapons and any kind of 
material considered strategic according to a NATO classification was 
forbidden. In this sense, the Canadian authorities fully co-operated with 
their American counterpart. On this matter, Prime Minister Diefenbaker's 
statement made in the House of Commons on 12 December 1960 will 
provide more details: 
We have not for some time permitted the export of arms, munitions 
and closely related goods to ... Cuba ... 
132 
Convergence and Divergence in United States and Canadian Cuba Policy 
Post-1959: A Triangular Comparative Analysis 
With respect to other goods of Canadian origin, there can be no 
valid objection to trade with Cuba as with other countries. The 
businessmen concerned will have to make their own judgments on 
the prospects for advantageous transactions. 
It is our wish, consistent with our relations with other countries, to 
maintain the kind of relation with Cuba, which is usual with the 
recognized government of another country. It is, of course, not our 
purpose to exploit the situation and we have no. intention of 
encouraging what in effect would amount to the bootlegging of 
goods of United States origin.51 
Convergence with the United States is here expressed in the form of 
official co-operation, not only in the questions of strategic material, but also 
in terms of the re-exportation of American goods. Canadian authorities 
repeatedly searched Cuban vessels to enforce such policy. 
In fact, perusal of the Control List will reveal that many items classified 
as "strategic" have little or no direct military use. Moreover, Diefenbaker 
was to later disclose in the House of Commons, during the Bay of Pigs 
Invasion, "no export of military equipment and related goods has been 
authorized for sale to the entire Caribbean region since July of 1959." Yet 
the 28 December 1960 issue of the Canada Gazette contained an 
amendment, which regulated Canadian trade with specified (i.e., 
Communist) countries, adding Cuba to these countries.52 
Hence, by this addition, Cuba had become "communist" in the eyes of the 
Canadian state, and thereafter trade with her was to be under surveillance 
and control, conforming substantially to American, and presumably 
NATO, regulations. This is even clearer in a statement made by the prime 
minister soon after the Bay of Pigs Invasion, on 19 April 1961 ,^ 3 when he 
expressed his government's "deep concern over developments in Cuba and 
characterized Cuba as a bridgehead of international communism 
threatening the hemisphere, a danger to which Canada could not be 
indifferent." In a subsequent statement on hemisphere and global problems 
on July 1961, he stated, "The Canadian Government is as concerned as any 
government over the Communistic trends of the Cuban Government.54 
Nevertheless, in terms of foreign policy, Canadian Cuba policy continued 
to diverge from that of the United States. The two countries held divergent 
approaches in ballistic missile defence and nuclear weapons, despite the 
fact that there was an indirect threat to Canadian security due to Canada's 
geographic position just beneath the shortest air route between the 
continental United States and the then USSR. 
There is no more dramatic event in the history of the Cold War than the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union came to 
the brink of a nuclear confrontation that would have been the most 
devastating conflict in human history. The event in itself has been the object 
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of numerous international conferences, books, and films. In most, with the 
notable exception of Peter Haydon's important contribution,55 the role of 
Canada tends to be minimized, as is the role of Cuba. One aspect relevant to 
the main argument of this article is that the missile crisis was a time of a 
crisis in Canada-US relations due to, among other things, the divergent 
view of Prime Minister Diefenbaker on how to deal with the situation and to 
which extent Canada had to be involved. As Peter Haydon reminds us, "One 
of the problems within the Canadian response to the Cuban missile crisis 
was the very different perception of its nature and implications.56 On the 
other hand, due to the intricate interconnection of Canadian and US 
military, the Canadian Navy's participation in the events must not be 
underestimated. 
The United States and Canadian governments would also co-operate 
intensively in the field of intelligence. Through the Canadian embassy in 
Havana, the Canadian government provided intelligence on Cuba on a 
regular basis to the United States and other allies during the early years of 
the Cuban Revolution. According to Professor Don Munton of the 
University of Northern British Columbia, Canadian diplomats would be 
sent out to collect intelligence on military installations and other things in 
Cuba important to the Americans. In October 1962, Canadian embassy 
officials reported on the initial preparations for the installations of missiles 
in Cuba. Minutes of high-level meetings between Canadian and Cuban 
officials were also made available to US Intelligence. 
Conclusion 
While the relationship between Canada and the United States has 
historically been close, their divergence stems from the founding principles 
upon which both nations emerged as independent states and the place they 
have occupied within the international system. The Canadian state, due in 
part to the challenges of the geographical, economic, and defence and 
security reality, has favoured multilateralism and "middlepowermanship" 
in its dealings with the United States. The issue of Cuba policy after 1959 
has been especially complex due to the nature and dynamics of Canada-US 
and Cuba-US relations. The actions and reactions of all three actors 
involved in the triangle during the first years following the triumph of the 
Cuban Revolution have set the tone for the years to come with striking 
regularity. 
The end of the Cold War brought about very important changes in the 
international system. The bipolar world ended, the United States emerged 
as the sole super power determined to extend neo-liberalism to the remotest 
corners of the globe by benefiting from the advantages of the objective 
process of globalization. 
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In that context, it is fair to assert that the relationship between Cuba and 
the Unites States has continued to be characterized by Cold War-style 
confrontation, since the Cuban state has stayed the nationalist course set 
after 1959 and the United States has increased its efforts to bring about the 
end of the Cuban government. The American policy is almost exclusively 
designed by and constructed on the basis of information provided by the 
right-wing sector of the Cuban-American community in South Florida. On 
the other hand, Canada-Cuba policy has continued to stress engagement, 
trade, and political dialogue despite ideological disagreement. From the 
Conservative John Diefenbaker during the hottest period of the Cold War to 
the Liberal Jean Chrétien in the early years of the post-Cold War 1990s to 
the current Conservative government of Canada in the first decade of the 
21st century, successive Canadian governments have maintained trade 
relations, diplomatic engagement, and political dialogue, with highs and 
lows, with Cuba over the last 49 years. Canada has indeed been more 
tolerant of ideological pluralism in other countries than the United States. 
The United States and Canada will continue to converge in many aspects 
of their foreign policy, as well, especially on the need to extend the Western 
pattern of civilization all over the world, and especially in the western 
hemisphere. The objective process of globalization has reinforced the 
condition of complex interdependence that characterizes the bilateral 
relationship between the North American neighbours. Consequently, their 
economies may continue along the path of deeper integration and the 
consolidation of the continentalist trend, the post-9/11 United States 
security concerns may lead to even greater co-operation and harmonization 
in terms of defence and security, and both countries will hold responsibility 
for a shared environment. However, the two North American nations will 
also continue to diverge, especially in terms of the means to pursue their 
own foreign policy agenda, as the last 49 years of Cuba policy have shown. 
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